Philosophy | Philosophers


The annual University of Notre Dame School of Architecture Driehaus Prize events were held this past weekend in Chicago. I was fortunate to attend, along with my dear friend and colleague Kevin Hart AIA, FRSA.

Kevin handed me a printed version of the acceptance address Andrés Duany delivered when he was awarded the Prize in 2008. You can read this remarkable document here.

Duany contributes an inspired manifesto to the new urban conversation, proposing a ‘new ethos’ that would expand the classical architectural canon to engage the 21st century by using folk vernacular as the springboard for transcending the authority of masters and masterpieces.

Duany makes a hugely valuable distinction between vernacular style and the vernacular mind:

Not “the vernacular,” which is a style, but the vernacular mind, which is the way of folk art. It is the ability to compose from memory and circumstance, with found materials, of working sequentially through anything and everything, with craft but not perfection.

Duany argues for tapping the power of the vernacular mind to claim “an enormous amount of new territory” for architectural classicism and the high peaks of 21st century architecture. Hats off!

Theory of mind is also on the mind of economist Robert J. Shiller, who ponders theory of mind in relation to the current financial crisis and economic forecasts in his recent article, “It Pays to Understand the Mind-Set.”

As Schiller describes, theory of mind is “defined by cognitive scientists as humans’ innate ability, evolved over millions of years, to judge others’ changing thinking, their understandings, their intentions, their pretenses. It is a judgment facility, quite different from our quantitative faculties.”

Only good things can happen when esteemed town planners and economists start talking about theory of mind.

More on cognitive science and theory of mind is available at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


Portrait of Plato, by Sean Benton

Plato

Everything that deceives can be said to enchant. – Plato

Daphne Merkin nailed the Madoff persona in her piece “If Looks Could Steal.” Madoff’s clients were believers. Here is a sample of her insightful analysis:

Given the demonization of Mr. Madoff and the intense sympathy for the plight of those smaller investors who trusted him, it is easy to forget that he actually did bring something to the table. Indeed, what is lost amid the fury of some of those who handed their money over to him is that theirs was a voluntary — nay, eager — association. No one was holding a gun to anyone’s head, saying sign up with Mr. Madoff or else.

Far from it: people scrambled to find a home within his financial orbit, auditioning for the role of Madoff client the way you would try out for a place at an Ivy League college, nudging connections to put in a good word, calling in favors to get in on a piece of the Madoff action. (Although those who were duped are referred to in the press as “victims,” it seems to me it would be more accurate to define them as casualties. Victims are specifically sought out; casualties are an indirect consequence of some larger action.)

What Mr. Madoff brought to the table, I think, was a sense of mishpocha, of being part of an extended family, but one you carefully chose rather than being arbitrarily born into. He seemed to humanize the cold, frequently anonymous business of investing by giving it an avuncular face. By all accounts, he was the quintessential nice guy.

Brilliant.

Link to the illustration and more on Plato.

Entrepreneurs of early stage, high-growth, tech-centered ventures – like me – depend on venture capitalists. True VCs are a breed apart from other investors. They understand the three big early stage risks – technology, finance and management – and they bring valuable talent to bear on mitigating those risks in return for a handsome upside return if things work. They also understand that despite best efforts, the odds of success are long, so they diversify their portfolio to mitigate the risk of being a VC.

Beneficial money – so-called smart money – decreases risk and adds material benefit. Part of the entrepreneur’s job, therefore, includes seeing the venture from the VC’s point of view, reducing friction so the venture rolls more easily when value-added money increases momentum, counteracting drag. The goal is to grease the wheels and keep them on.

That grease is a powerful force for good in the quest for safety, security, stability and return on investment. Keeping things well-greased involves blurring the line between rationality and intuition. Rationality is necessary but insufficient. Creative skills are equally important. In my case, design training really helps.

Spending time inside an early stage growth company can be a memorable experience because synergy creates energy, making early stage companies alluring and seductive, even infectious. [Apple is revered in part because it is a singular example of a large company that innovates and designs like an early stage company, making it alluring and seductive for consumers seeking the thrill of associating with this type of energy. Best wishes for a complete recovery, Mr. Jobs, and god speed to those who are stepping up in his absence.]

It takes courage to be a true VC. The type of investor I am allergic to is the more cautious investor who uses skepticism to masquerade as a true venture capitalist, but who is really looking for low risk in a high-risk investing arena.

The skeptic “overstands” all the above intellectually, but does not “understand” that on the early stage playing field, guts and money are different commodities. The problem isn’t the caution, it is the hidden agenda.

The original Skeptics were members of an ancient Greek school of philosophy who argued that real knowledge of things is impossible. Their descendants are skeptics with a small ‘s’ who doubt or question the possibility of real knowledge of any kind.

This type of skepticism is analytic, aimed at cogent assessment. The purpose is inquiry, not criticism. I have no inherent allergy to this type of skeptic or Skepticism as a philosophical position. In fact, questioning the validity or authenticity of something purporting to be factual can be valuable. For example, we all would have benefited if we had paid closer attention to skeptics concerned about the purported facts about the interest rates on adjustable rate home mortgages or the ratings of CDO’s and other derivative investments by Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s.

The skeptic I am allergic to is the person who maintains a doubting attitude regardless of the assessment. The purpose of the assessment, which sometimes is only revealed over time, betrays a hidden and contradictory skeptical agenda whereby doubts about values, plans, statements, or even the character of others are intended to enforce the superiority of the skeptic’s values, plans and statements.

The skeptic’s unstated aim in the most extreme cases is to render the Other irrelevant. Interactions with this type of skeptic go nowhere good, devolving into power struggles over the legitimacy of purported facts and plans, revealing a fundamental belief that theirs are the better choices. Instead of saying, “Let’s get heads together to devise our unique brand of grease, the skeptic essentially says, “My brand of grease is better than your brand of grease.” This is unhelpful.

I might as well go all the down the rabbit hole and explain that this type of skeptic reminds me of the parable of the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, which I studied in undergrad philosophy, in which the Grand Inquisitor decides that Jesus is irrelevant. The parable uses religion to raise larger issues of belief.

The Grand Inquisitor recounts the responses Jesus makes to three questions Satan asked Jesus during his temptation in the desert. On the basis of those responses, the Grand Inquisitor determines that Jesus believes that humans have the freedom to choose. The Grand Inquisitor holds a different position – most humans do not have the freedom to choose. Therefore, the Grand Inquisitor decides that Jesus is irrelevant because by his responses to Satan, Jesus has excluded the majority of humanity from redemption and thus doomed humanity to suffer.

In my view, suffering is optional; therefore, interacting with skeptics is voluntary. My choice is not to be confused with solipsism. I will leave that topic for another time. But if you want to go down that rabbit hole, here is the link to solipsism at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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